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What obligations do States Parties to the World Heritage Convention have to 
protect World Heritage sites from the adverse impacts of climate change? 
 
Anna Huggins, BInSt LLB (Hons) University of New South Wales 
 
Abstract 
Through its mandate to protect and preserve places of „outstanding universal value‟, the 
World Heritage Convention provides an unlikely yet effective tool in global efforts to 
mitigate climate change. The practical efficacy of the Strategy to Assist States Parties to 
Implement Appropriate Management Responses (the Strategy), which represents the 
World Heritage Committee‟s primary response to the threats posed by climate change to 
World Heritage sites, is undermined by its weak stance on mitigation. This paper argues 
that the World Heritage Convention imposes stronger obligations on States Parties than 
those contained in the Strategy, including a duty on States Parties to commit to „deep 
cuts‟ in greenhouse gas emissions. In order to ensure the continuing success of the World 
Heritage Convention States Parties must engage in extensive mitigation strategies without 
delay. 
 
I Introduction 
In recent years, the combined weight of the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate 
Change,
1
 Al Gore‟s movie crusade in An Inconvenient Truth and the UN 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change‟s (IPCC) Fourth Assessment Reports2 have 
contributed to a widespread consensus on the reality and gravity of anthropogenic climate 
change. As a result, public and political debate has shifted from whether or not climate 
change is occurring to what action needs to be taken to mitigate and manage adverse 
climate impacts. It is widely agreed that although some degree of climate change is 
inevitable as a result of historic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, „dangerous‟ climate 
change may still be prevented if global temperatures do not increase by more than an 
                                                 
1
 Stern N, “The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change” (2006)  
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/independent_reviews/stern_review_economics_ 
climate_change/stern_review_report.cfm (17 September 2007). Hereafter Stern Review. 
2
 See, eg, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), “Working Group I Report: The Physical 
Science Basis – Summary for Policy Makers” (2007) http://www.ipcc.ch/ (17 September 2007). 
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average of 2-3C. To achieve this, „deep cuts‟ in GHG emissions of 60-80 per cent less 
than 1990 levels will need to be achieved by 2050, with further reductions thereafter.
3
 
 
The primary mechanisms for addressing climate change at the international level are the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
4
 and its Kyoto Protocol
5
 
which sets binding, quantitative targets for GHG emissions. However, given the 
obfuscation of the Kyoto Protocol by the United States, one of the highest per capita 
GHG emitting countries in the world, and the limitations of the Kyoto Protocol in 
facilitating sufficient reductions in GHG emission to prevent „dangerous‟ climate change, 
other legal avenues for promoting greater action on climate change should be explored. 
Through its mandate to protect and preserve places of „outstanding universal value‟, 
many of which are grave risk from climate change, the World Heritage Convention (the 
Convention)
6
 provides one such avenue. 
 
The fact that “the impacts of climate change are affecting many World Heritage 
properties and are likely to affect many more, both natural and cultural, in the years 
ahead” was recognized by the World Heritage Committee7 at its 29th session in 2005.8 
The primary document representing the Committee‟s approach to this issue is the 
Strategy to Assist States Parties to Implement Appropriate Management Responses (the 
Strategy).
9
 This paper examines the efficacy of the Strategy in realising the objects of the 
Convention. It also considers whether the provisions of the Convention provide scope for 
stronger obligations on States Parties than those contained in the Strategy to mitigate 
climate change and thereby protect invaluable World Heritage sites. 
                                                 
3
 McGrath C, “Legal Liability for Climate Change in Queensland” (2007) unpublished, 4. 
4
 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 9 May 1992, 1771 
UNTS 107, in force 21 March 1994. 
5
 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 
11 December 1997, 37 ILM 22, in force 16 February 2005.  
6
 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, opened for signature 
16 November 1972, 1037 UNTS 151, in force 17 December 1975.  
7
 The full title of the World Heritage Committee is the Intergovernmental Committee for the Protection of 
the Cultural and Natural Heritage of Outstanding Universal Value.  
8
 Decision 29 Com 7B.a reproduced as part of UNESCO‟s recent report: UNESCO World Heritage Centre, 
“World Heritage Reports 22: Climate Change and World Heritage” (2007) 50 
http://whc.unesco.org/en/series/22/ (17 September 2007). 
9
 UNESCO World Heritage Centre, above n 8, 40-42. 
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II Climate Change and World Heritage 
The UNFCCC defines climate change as “a change of climate which is attributed directly 
or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and 
which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable periods of 
time”.10 Highly regarded sources such as the Stern Review and the IPCC confirm that 
climate change is occurring, is largely attributable to human activities, and “presents very 
serious global risks”.11 In its most recent Fourth Assessment Report, Working Group III 
of the IPCC concluded that global GHG emissions have increased by 70 per cent between 
1970 and 2004, and with “current climate change mitigation policies and related 
sustainable development practices will continue to grow over the next few decades”.12 By 
the end of this century, the global mean surface temperature is projected to increase by 
somewhere between 1.8 degrees Celsius (likely range 1.1 to 2.9 degrees Celsius) for a 
“low scenario” and 4.0 degrees Celsius (likely range 2.4 to 6.4 degrees Celsius) for a 
“high scenario”. The corresponding sea level rises for these low and high scenarios are 18 
to 83 centimetres, and 26 to 59 centimetres, respectively.
13
 
 
A host of other impacts are predicted to accompany rising temperatures and sea levels.
14
 
Sensitive environments and ecosystems worldwide, many of which are protected under 
the World Heritage Convention, are highly vulnerable to climatic variability. The World 
Heritage Committee has produced two recent reports – World Heritage Reports 22: 
Climate Change and World Heritage
15
 and Case Studies on Climate Change and World 
Heritage
16
 - detailing the impacts of climate change on World Heritage sites. According 
                                                 
10
 UNFCCC, above n 4, art 1. 
11
 Stern, above n 1, Executive Summary, i; IPCC, above n 2. 
12
 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), “Working Group III Report: Mitigation of Climate 
Change – Summary for Policy Makers” (2007) 3 http://www.ipcc.ch/ (17 September 2007). 
13
 IPCC, above n 2. 
14
 See, for example, Smith J and Shearman D, “Climate Change Litigation: Analysing the Law, Scientific 
Evidence and Impacts on the Environment, Health and Property” (South Australia: Presidian, 2006), 5-10. 
15
 UNESCO World Heritage Centre, above n 8. 
16
 UNESCO World Heritage Centre, “Case Studies on Climate Change and World Heritage” (2007) 
http://www.whc.unesco.org/documents/publi_climatechange.pdf (17 September 2007). 
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to these reports, the impacts on natural World Heritage
17
 include: the melting of glaciers 
in both mountainous and Polar Regions; increased bleaching and widespread death of 
coral as a result of rising sea temperatures and ocean acidification; implications for 
terrestrial biodiversity as a result of plant and animal species migration; changes in the 
timing of biological cycles; more intense and frequent bushfires; and migration of pests 
and invasive species.
18
 More broadly, the physical and biological changes resulting from 
climate change affect ecosystem functioning, with significant implications for the 
provision of ecosystems goods and services and therefore human livelihoods.
19
  
 
The climate vulnerability of six iconic World Heritage sites - Sagarmatha National Park 
in Nepal, Huascaran National Park in Peru, the Great Barrier Reef in Australia, Belize‟s 
Barrier Reef Reserve System, the Waterton-Glacier International Peace Park in the 
United States and Canada and Greater Blue Mountains World Heritage Area in Australia 
- has received particular attention as a result of recent petitions to have them included on 
the “List of World Heritage in Danger”. These petitions were made under Article 11(4) of 
the Convention, which provides a mechanism for the creation of an in danger list for 
World Heritage properties requiring heightened international and national protection.
20
 
Each of the six in-danger petitions filed has been in relation to a natural World Heritage 
site, possibly as a result of the fact that these sites are particularly at risk from climate 
impacts, are not able to be replaced or recreated by human efforts, and are inextricably 
interconnected with surrounding ecosystems and processes. Thus, whilst it is recognised 
that climate change will have significant impacts on cultural World Heritage sites as well, 
for the purposes of this discussion the focus will be on the protection of natural World 
Heritage sites.  
 
                                                 
17
 The Convention defines „natural heritage‟ to include: natural features “of outstanding universal value 
from the aesthetic or scientific point of view”; geological and physiological formations and areas “which 
constitute the habitat of threatened species of animals and plants of outstanding universal value from the 
point of view of science or conservation”; and natural sites or areas “of outstanding universal value from 
the point of view of science, conservation or natural beauty”: UNESCO World Heritage Centre, “UNESCO 
World Heritage Convention” (2007) Article 2 http://whc.unesco.org/en/conventiontext/ (17 September 
2007). 
18
 UNESCO World Heritage Centre, above n 8, 10; 14-15. 
19
 UNESCO World Heritage Centre, above n 8, 20. 
20
 UNESCO World Heritage Centre, above n 17. 
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The protection of World Heritage sites may seem a relatively trivial concern considering 
the broader ecosystem degradation and devastation likely to result from unabated climate 
change. However, the iconic nature and high profile of many World Heritage sites makes 
them ideally suited to build public and political support for greater action to ameliorate 
climate impacts.
21
 This is reinforced by the idea that heritage sites are „places in the 
heart‟, that is “places and objects [that] contribute to a sensory and emotional perception 
of belonging, of home and community”.22 As a result, current and future climate change 
impacts on these sites are likely to be more tangible and immediate to ordinary people 
than the science of GHG concentrations in the atmosphere or global temperature 
variations.
23
 Moreover, measures taken to protect these sites from climate change will 
potentially have flow-on positive effects for other sensitive environmental areas and 
ecosystems not subject to World Heritage protection. This is because States have special 
obligations in relation to the protection of World Heritage sites, and if strong measures 
are taken to meet these obligations by, for example, reducing GHG emissions to mitigate 
climate change impacts on protected areas, other non-protected areas will also benefit. As 
Achim Steiner, Director General of the World Conservation Union (IUCN) comments: 
 
World Heritage is not only about protecting places of exceptional value; 
they also protect some of the most important and endangered biodiversity of 
the planet and maintain ecosystems critical to the well-being of millions of 
people.
24
 
 
Thus, the World Heritage Convention emerges as a somewhat unlikely, but nonetheless 
effective, tool in the fight against climate change.  
 
III The World Heritage Convention 
                                                 
21
 UNESCO World Heritage Centre, above n 16, 6.  
22
 Lyster R, Lipman Z, Franklin N, Wiffen G and Pearson L, Environmental and Planning Law in NSW 
(Leichhardt: The Federation Press, 2007), 380. 
23
 Hunter D, “The Implications of Climate Change Litigation for International Environmental Law-
Making” (2007) http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1005345 (10 September 2007), 4. 
24
 World Conservation Union, “Facing the Threat of Climate Change at Natural World Heritage Sites” 
(2007) http://www.iucn.org/en/news/archive/2006/03/17_cc_wh.htm (30 September 2007). 
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The World Heritage Convention was adopted by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) on 16 November 
1972. The Preamble reflects the Convention‟s raison d’etre, recognising that as:  
 
[P]arts of the cultural or natural heritage are of outstanding interest and … 
need to be preserved as part of the world heritage of mankind … it is 
incumbent on the international community as a whole to participate in the 
protection of the cultural and natural heritage of outstanding universal 
value, by the granting of collective assistance which, although not taking 
the place of action by the State concerned, will serve as an effective 
complement thereto.
25
 
 
The Convention‟s protection strategy for sites with universal heritage value is three-
pronged – “listing of heritage sites, recognition of sites in danger, and financial support 
for maintenance and restoration of sites”.26 The World Heritage Committee, which is 
composed of 21 States Parties elected by the General Assembly of States Parties for a 
fixed term, oversees the administration of the Convention. The Convention is one of the 
most widely adopted multilateral environmental agreements with 184 States Parties. As 
of 11 October 2007, there were 851 sites inscribed on the list, including 660 cultural sites, 
166 natural sites, and 25 mixed cultural and natural properties in 141 countries.
27
  
 
The primary obligations assumed by States Parties to the Convention are found in 
Articles 4, 5 and 6. In line with the principle of State sovereignty, each Party assumes the 
primary responsibility for the preservation and protection of World Heritage sites within 
its territory. Article 4 provides that: 
 
[e]ach State Party to this Convention recognizes that the duty of ensuring 
the identification, protection, conservation, presentation and transmission to 
                                                 
25
 UNESCO World Heritage Centre, above n 17. 
26
 Hunter D, Salzman J and Zaelke D, International Environmental Law and Policy 3
rd 
ed (New York: The 
Foundation Press, 2007), 1161. 
27
 UNESCO World Heritage Centre “World Heritage List” (2007) http://whc.unesco.org/en/list (11 October 
2007). 
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future generations of the cultural and natural heritage…situated on its 
territory, belongs primarily to that State. It will do all it can to this end, to 
the utmost of its own resources…28 
 
The obligation of States to take all necessary actions to protect World Heritage areas is 
built upon in Article 5. This Article includes, inter alia, obligations on States Parties to 
“endeavor, in so far as possible” to develop methods to counteract dangers that threaten 
their cultural or natural heritage
29
 and to “take appropriate legal, scientific, technical, 
administrative and financial measures necessary for the identification, protection, 
conservation, presentation and rehabilitation of this heritage”.30 
 
As foreshadowed in the Preamble, although the chief responsibility for the protection of 
World Heritage sites lies with the State in which they are situated, the Convention 
recognises that some threats to World Heritage cannot be addressed by national efforts 
alone. Thus, Article 6(1) recognises the duty of the international community as a whole to 
cooperate to protect World Heritage sites and Article 6(3) imposes an obligation on the 
States Parties “not to take any deliberate measure which might damage directly or 
indirectly … [heritage sites] … situated on the territory of other States Parties”.31 
Collectively, these provisions comprise the responsibility of States Parties to cooperate to 
preserve sites with universal heritage value for the benefit of current and future 
generations. 
 
IV The World Heritage Committee’s Response to Climate Change 
An examination of the primary obligations in Articles 4, 5 and 6 raises the question: does 
the World Heritage Convention impose an obligation on States Parties to protect World 
Heritage sites from the effects of climate change? The World Heritage Committee has 
indicated that the answer to this question is yes, although opinions on the extent of this 
obligation differ widely. As outlined above, from November 2004 to July 2005, NGOs 
                                                 
28
 UNESCO World Heritage Centre, above n 17. 
29
 Ibid, Art. 5(c). 
30
 Ibid, Art. 5(d). 
31
 Ibid. 
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submitted three petitions and a report to the World Heritage Committee requesting that 
certain World Heritage sites particularly at risk from climate change be included on the 
“List of World Heritage in Danger”.32 In response to these petitions, the World Heritage 
Committee adopted Decision 29 Com 7B.a in July 2005 which recognised the threat 
climate change posed to many World Heritage properties and encouraged States Parties 
to “seriously consider the potential impacts of climate change within their management 
planning” for such sites.33 It also requested the creation of a working group of experts to 
study the risks to World Heritage arising from climate change, the outcomes of which led 
to the publication of a report on Predicting and Managing the Effects of Climate Change 
on World Heritage (the Joint Report) and the Strategy to Assist States Parties to 
Implement Appropriate Management Responses.
34
 The Strategy, which was endorsed in 
Decision 30 Com 7.1 in July 2006,
35
 represents the World Heritage Committee‟s chief 
response to addressing the threats posed by climate change to World Heritage sites. The 
steps the World Heritage Committee has taken to date to respond to the concerns raised 
in the Petitions indicate that it considers climate change impacts to be within the ambit of 
the types of risks the Convention was designed to address. 
 
What does the Strategy require or recommend that States Parties do in order to protect 
World Heritage sites from adverse climate change impacts? Essentially, the Strategy 
outlines three types of action that need to be taken to address climate change falling 
under the broad headings of “preventive actions”, “corrective actions” and “sharing 
knowledge”.36 Each heading is then broken down further into global level, regional and 
State party/site level actions. Some of the recommendations of the Strategy include: 
                                                 
32
 These first four petitions related to the Sagarmatha National Park in Nepal, Huascaran National Park in 
Peru, the Great Barrier Reef in Australia and Belize‟s Barrier Reef Reserve System. Since July 2005, two 
further submissions have been made regarding the Waterton-Glacier International Peace Park in the United 
States and Canada (submitted on 16 February 2006) and the Greater Blue Mountains World Heritage Area 
in Australia (submitted on 22 June 2007). 
33
 UNESCO World Heritage Centre, above n 8.  
34
 Both documents were reproduced as part of UNESCO‟s Climate Change and World Heritage Report: 
UNESCO World Heritage Centre, above n 8. 
35
 UNESCO World Heritage Centre, above n 16, 7. Decision 30 Com 7.1 further requested that the World 
Heritage Centre prepare a policy document to provide decision- and policy-makers with guidance on, inter 
alia, synergies between conventions, research needs and legal issues. This policy document was published 
in June 2008: UNESCO World Heritage Centre, “Policy Document on the Impacts of Climate Change on 
World Heritage Properties” (2008) http://whc.unesco.org/en/CC-policy-document/ (2 October 2008). 
36
 UNESCO World Heritage Centre, above n 8, [3]. 
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increased monitoring and reporting of climate impacts on individual sites;
37
 reducing 
non-climatic stress factors on sites;
38
 the integration of climate change issues, including 
risk preparedness and adaptation, into the management plans of new and existing sites;
39
 
the development of pilot projects to promote lessons learnt and best practices;
40
 greater 
interlinkages and knowledge sharing with other conventions, instruments and 
institutions;
41
 and using the global network of World Heritage sites to raise public and 
political awareness about the impacts of climate change on World Heritage sites.
42
 In 
terms of mitigation, the Strategy explicitly states that “the UNFCCC is the UN instrument 
through which mitigation strategies at the global and States Parties level is being 
addressed”.43 It also encourages the reduction of GHG emissions at the site level.44 
 
Although the Strategy makes valuable suggestions on techniques to manage climate 
change impacts on World Heritage sites, its overall effectiveness in terms of protecting 
these sites from such impacts is greatly hampered by its soft stance on mitigation. The 
Strategy was ostensibly developed after close analysis of the issues discussed in the Joint 
Report,
45
 yet the limitations of the mitigation approach adopted in the Strategy are clearly 
foreshadowed in the earlier report. The Joint Report recommends the implementation of 
site-level mitigation and adaptation techniques, as advocated in the Strategy. However, 
this is only one part of a „two-pronged approach‟, the second half of which requires:  
 
States Parties and site managers…to look beyond the individual site level 
and develop and implement regional and/or transboundary mitigation and 
                                                 
37
 Ibid [7-11]. 
38
 Ibid [12]. 
39
 Ibid [19]. 
40
 Ibid [24]; [41]. 
41
 Ibid [25]. The conventions referred to in the Joint Report, upon which the Strategy was based, included 
the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol, UNESCO‟s Programme on Man and the Biosphere, the Ramsar 
Convention on Wetlands, the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change: UNESCO World Heritage Centre, above n 8, 28-30. 
42
 Ibid [37]. 
43
 Ibid [13]. 
44
 Ibid [16].  
45
 Ibid Prelude. 
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adaptation strategies that reduce the vulnerability of natural World Heritage 
sites in a larger landscape or seascape context.
46
 
 
The Strategy is notably silent on any action to be taken in relation to this second prong, 
severely undermining its efficacy in terms of mitigating climate impacts on World 
Heritage sites. This is despite the fact that the Joint Report‟s recommendations are clearly 
conservative, stopping short of advocating a general mitigation strategy. Moreover, the 
Joint Report notes that the benefit of site-level mitigation is “likely to be negligible on a 
quantitative basis”.47 Reduction of global GHG emissions to mitigate climate impacts is 
by far the most effective and comprehensive way to protect World Heritage sites from 
climate change.  As Thorson notes, 
 
Many World Heritage sites will never be preserved for transmission to 
future generations unless the States Parties, led by the World Heritage 
Committee, act more proactively than merely supporting site-specific 
mitigation.
48
  
 
The Strategy‟s approach for site-specific mitigation falls far short of the „deep cuts‟ in 
GHG emissions advocated by the world‟s climate experts,49 and indeed fails to fully 
implement the circumspect and cautious recommendations in the Joint Report. Thus, the 
Strategy‟s practical efficacy is questionable.  
 
The appropriateness of the Strategy can also be assessed by its conformity to relevant 
principles of international environmental law (IEL). Firstly, the Convention itself 
embodies a number of IEL principles. As reflected in the Preamble, the Convention 
attempts to strike a balance between „State sovereignty over natural resources‟, that is, 
                                                 
46
 UNESCO World Heritage Centre, above n 8, 34.  
47
 Ibid 37.  
48
 Thorson E, “The World Heritage Convention and Climate Change: The Case for a Climate-Change 
Mitigation Strategy beyond the Kyoto Protocol” (2007) 13 http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=981643 (10 
September 2007). 
49
 Whether or not the terms of the Convention can be read as imposing an obligation on State Parties to 
drastically reduce their GHG emissions is discussed in Part V below.  
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the rights of the State to exploit the resources within its jurisdiction,
50
 and the „duty of 
States to cooperate‟ with other States in addressing international environmental issues51 
to protect sites of outstanding universal value. This latter principle is premised upon the 
recognition that some natural and cultural resources that are located within State 
boundaries are the „common concern of humankind‟52 and should be preserved for future 
generations.
53
 Moreover, Article 4 obliges States Parties to, inter alia, protect and 
conserve World Heritage sites in their territory, bringing into play the „precautionary 
principle‟ which provides that scientific uncertainty should not be used as a reason for 
delaying action to prevent environmental degradation.
54
 Moreover, the obligation in 
Article 6(3) that States Parties cannot cause damage to World Heritage sites within 
another State‟s territory reflects the „duty not to cause transboundary harm‟, that is, the 
duty of States to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction do not cause environmental 
damage to other States,
55
 and the „principle of pollution prevention‟, which emphasises 
the need to take action to prevent prospective environmental degradation.
56
 The principle 
of „common but differentiated responsibilities‟, which recognises that the differing social, 
economic and ecological situations of countries should be taken into account when 
determining their responsibilities for protection of the global environment,
57
 is also 
evident in the wording of Article 4, which says a State Party must do all it can “to the 
utmost of its own resources”, and Article 5, which specifies that States must endeavour to 
undertake appropriate measures “in so far as possible”. An understanding of the 
principles of IEL underpinning the Convention provides a useful framework for 
analysing the extent to which the Strategy reflects and/or diverges from IEL concepts.  
 
                                                 
50
 See, eg, Principle 21 of the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 
U.N. Doc. A/Conf.48/14/Rev.1 (1973) (Stockholm Declaration): Hunter et al, above n 25, 472-6.  
51
 The „duty to cooperate‟ is reflected in Principle 24 of the Stockholm Declaration: ibid 525-526. 
52
 The principle that the protection of the global environment is the common concern of humanity is 
reflected in, inter alia, the Preamble to the UNFCCC, above n 4. See discussion in Hunter et al, above n 25, 
489-491. 
53
 The principle of „intergenerational equity‟, which involves “meeting the needs of present generations 
without sacrificing the needs of future generations”, was outlined in the 1987 Report of the Brundtland 
Commission, Our Common Future: ibid 491-494. 
54
 The precautionary principle is defined in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.151/26 (Vol. 1) (1992) (Rio Declaration): ibid 510-512. 
55
 See, eg, Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration and Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration: ibid 502-507.  
56
 See, eg, Principle 6 of the Stockholm Declaration: ibid 507-510. 
57
 See, eg, Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration: ibid 495-497.  
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The weak language and conservative recommendations regarding mitigation contained in 
the Strategy suggest that the principle of „State sovereignty over natural resources‟ is the 
prevailing paradigm in the document. As mentioned above, there is no recommendation 
that States Parties reduce their GHG emissions, or be encouraged to sign up to the Kyoto 
Protocol as contained in Resolution VIII.3 of the COP to the Ramsar Convention,
58
 
which would clearly alleviate the threats caused by climate change yet may encroach 
upon States‟ abilities to act as they choose within their own territories. The 
recommendations in the Strategy for States Parties to share knowledge of best practices 
in regards to site management and adaptation with other States Parties, and for the World 
Heritage Committee to cooperate more closely with other international conventions, 
instruments and institutions working to address climate change reflect the „duty to 
cooperate‟ to ameliorate adverse climate impacts. The implicit principles underlying such 
efforts are the protection of the „common concern of humankind‟ and „intergenerational 
equity‟. The Strategy also mentions “guidance, capacity building and financial assistance 
or assistance for developing project proposals”59 and improved networking and 
knowledge sharing across north-south and south-south States Parties,
60
 which invokes the 
principle of „common but differentiated responsibilities‟, albeit in a „soft‟ manner. The 
suggestion that relevant stakeholders, including local communities and users of the site, 
be informed about the impacts of climate change and management responses to 
addressing this issue also encourages a role for „public participation‟61 in protecting 
World Heritage sites. However, as previously mentioned, the mitigation approach 
adopted by the Strategy is ineffectual, and does not do justice to the „precautionary 
principle‟, the „principle of pollution prevention‟ and the „duty to prevent transboundary 
harm‟ by reducing GHG emissions. Thus, the Strategy‟s weak application of some IEL 
principles and lack of conformity with others highlights its inadequacy as a tool for 
protecting World Heritage sites from climate change impacts. 
 
                                                 
58
 Millar I, “International Legal Frameworks for Climate Change and Biodiversity” (2006) 
www.edo.org.au/edonsw/site/pdf/biodiv_clim_change_paper0600426.pdf (10 September 2007), 18.  
59
 UNESCO World Heritage Centre, above n 8, [24]. 
60
 Ibid [36].  
61
 The idea that “environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned citizens, at 
the relevant level” is reflected in Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration: Hunter et al, above n 25, 534-535. 
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In summary, the Strategy adopted by the World Heritage Committee is primarily 
concerned with monitoring and adapting to the impacts of climate change upon World 
Heritage sites, ostensibly on the basis that broader mitigation strategies are beyond the 
scope of the Convention. The above analysis indicates that the Strategy fails for lack of 
practical efficacy and principle. The question remains, however, as to whether the 
Strategy represents the full extent of actions in relation to climate change that are within 
the mandate of the Convention, or whether there is in fact scope for more far reaching 
obligations under Articles 4, 5 and 6. 
 
V Other Possible Responses to Climate Change under the Convention 
Each of the in danger petitions to date have argued that the obligations under the 
Convention require States Parties to adopt mitigation strategies that include a drastic 
reduction in their national GHG emissions.
62
 In this Section, I will assess the merits of 
this line of argument using the most recent petition relating to the Greater Blue 
Mountains World Heritage Area (the GBMWHA Petition)
63
 as an exemplar. This petition 
is appropriate for this purpose as it was filed on 22 June 2007, sixteen months later than 
the next most recent petition concerning the Waterton-Glacier International Peace Park 
filed in February 2006. Thus the GBMWHA Petition refers to the World Heritage 
Committee‟s response to the previous Petitions, the Joint Report and the Strategy, as well 
as recent scientific evidence from, inter alia, the IPCC, in making the case for an in 
danger listing. 
 
A. The GBMWHA Petition 
The GBMWHA consists of 1.03 million ha dominated by temperate eucalypt forests. The 
site is “noted for its representation of the evolutionary adaptation and diversification of 
                                                 
62
 Thorson, above n 48, 1. 
63
 Climate Action Network Australia (CANA), Friends of the Earth Australia, NSW Nature Conservation 
Council and Greenpeace Australia Pacific, “Petition to the 31st Session of the World Heritage Committee 
at Christchurch, New Zealand from 23 June 2007 to 1 July 2007 Requesting Inscription of The Greater 
Blue Mountains World Heritage Area in the List of World Heritage in Danger and for Protective Measures 
and Actions” (2007) 
www.climatelaw.org/media/UNESCO%20Blue%20Mountains.pdf (17 September 2007). 
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the eucalypts in post-Gondwana isolation on the Australian continent”.64 The GBMWHA 
Petition details the risks posed by climate change, including more frequent and 
destructive bushfires, species invasion, and shrinkage and dislocation that may jeopardise 
the outstanding universal value of the site.
65
 For the purposes of satisfying Article 11(4), 
the Petition argues that the GBMWHA faces “specific and proven imminent danger” due 
to climate change impacts.
66
 It therefore calls for the GBMWHA‟s inscription on the in 
danger list without delay.
67
 The Petition goes on to provide an extensive list of 
„achievable‟ measures and actions that Australia could take to meet its obligations under 
the Convention, particularly if the GBMWHA was subject to additional protection under 
Article 11(4). Relevantly for this discussion, these measures include ratification of the 
Kyoto Protocol
68
 and the implementation of legislation mandating a national emissions 
reduction target of at least 30 per cent below 1990 levels by 2020, with a long-term target 
of at least 80 per cent below 1990 levels by 2050.
69
 
 
B. The Extent of States Parties’ Obligations under Articles 4, 5 and 6 
The issue of whether or not the far-reaching measures called for by the GBMWHA 
Petition are within the ambit of the obligations imposed by the Convention hinges on the 
interpretation of Articles 4, 5 and 6. In other words, are these provisions mere 
recommendations to be implemented at the discretion of States Parties or do they impose 
more substantive obligations? Looking firstly at the broad provisions in Article 4, States 
are merely obliged to “recognize” their duties with regards to World Heritage sites. 
Similarly in Article 5, the precatory verb “endeavor” is employed, as is qualifying 
language such as “as far as possible”. Is the language of the Convention text so vague70 
and discretionary that it precludes a reading of binding obligation? This issue was 
                                                 
64
 UNESCO World Heritage Centre, “Greater Blue Mountains Area” (2007) 
http://whc.unesco.org/pg.cfm?cid=31&id_site=917 (17 September 2007). 
65
 UNESCO World Heritage Centre, above n 63, 15-17.  
66
 This is pursuant to the requirements in paragraphs 177-180 of the Convention‟s Operational Guidelines: 
see UNESCO World Heritage Centre, above n 63, 16. 
67
 Ibid 56. 
68
 Ibid 58. 
69
 Ibid 61. 
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 As Affolder notes, this vagueness “reflects the unresolved balancing of communal obligations and state 
sovereignty and the sacrificing of precision to secure universal acceptance”: Affolder N, “Mining and the 
World Heritage Convention: Democratic Legitimacy and Treaty Compliance” (2007) 24 Pace 
Environmental Law Review 35-66, 66. 
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considered by the High Court of Australia in Commonwealth v Tasmania.
71
 A narrow 
majority of the Court held that, notwithstanding the qualifying language in Articles 4 and 
5, these Articles impose a binding legal obligation on Australia to take appropriate 
measures for the protection of World Heritage sites. Deane J in the majority held that the 
lack of precision in the language of Articles 4 and 5 did not prevent Australia assuming 
real and substantive obligations with respect to the World Heritage areas in question.
72
 
Similarly, Mason J held that Article 5 imposed obligations on each State which “could 
not be read as a mere statement of intention: it was expressed in the form of a command 
requiring each party to endeavour to bring about the matters dealt with” in the 
subparagraphs.
73
 His Honour nonetheless recognised that “there may be an element of 
discretion and value judgment on the part of the State to decide what measures are 
necessary and appropriate”, however, this discretion extends to the manner of 
performance not to the issue of performance or non-performance of the obligation.
74
 
 
The High Court‟s interpretation of Articles 4 and 5 in Commonwealth v Tasmania75 is 
consistent with international law principles. According to the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, a treaty must be interpreted “in accordance with the ordinary meaning of 
the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose”.76 Here, the 
Court‟s finding that Articles 4 and 5 impose substantive and binding obligations on States 
Parties accords with the natural and ordinary meaning of these provisions. Principles of 
international law also provide guidance on how the terms of treaties should be 
implemented. In particular, the principle of pacta sunt servanda, arguably the most 
fundamental principle of treaty law, provides that States are bound to perform their 
                                                 
71
 Commonwealth of Australia v Tasmania [1983] HCA 21. 
72
 Ibid at [23] (per Deane J). 
73
 Ibid at [31] (per Mason J). 
74
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international treaty obligations in good faith.
77
 Thus, as Thorson argues, the aims of the 
Convention – namely, the protection and conservation of World Heritage – guide the 
implementation of States Parties‟ obligations to implement Articles 4 and 5 in good 
faith.
78
  
 
In contrast to the preceding two articles, the language in Article 6 is less discretionary 
and does not contain any qualifications. Relevantly, Article 6(3) states that States Parties 
“undertake not to take any deliberate measures” which will damage World Heritage sites 
in other States. The ordinary meaning of Article 6(3) imposes a non-discretionary 
obligation on States not to deliberately harm other States‟ World Heritage. The travaux 
preparatoires support this natural construction; although earlier drafts of this Article 
contained the qualifier that States will refrain from causing damage to other States‟ 
World Heritage “as far as possible”, this language of limitation was deliberately excluded 
from the final version of Article 6(3).
79
 In summary, then, Articles 4, 5 and 6 of the 
Convention provide binding obligations on States Parties with regards to the protection of 
World Heritage sites in their own and other States‟ territories. 
 
C. Does the Convention Require Aggressive Mitigation Strategies? 
Having examined the nature and extent of the obligations imposed by the substantive 
provisions of the Convention, it is possible to assess whether the calls for aggressive 
mitigation strategies in the GBMWHA Petition fall within the scope of the Convention. 
Arguably, the effect of Articles 4, 5 and 6, when read together, is to impose an obligation 
on States Parties to drastically reduce their GHG emissions to protect their own and other 
countries‟ World Heritage sites. Turning first to Article 4, a literal interpretation of this 
Article suggests that if States are to do “all [they] can”, “to the utmost of [their] own 
resources” to protect World Heritage sites within their territories from climate change, 
                                                 
77
 Ibid Article 26. 
78
 Thorson, above n 48, 7. Significantly, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has indicated that the 
“present-day state of scientific knowledge”, in this case pertaining to climate change, may be used as a 
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Dec. 1999, discussed in Hunter et al, above n 25, 312. 
79
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national measures for „deep cuts‟80 in GHG emissions are required. As outlined above, 
this is the mitigation strategy being advocated by the world‟s leading climate experts to 
prevent „dangerous‟ climate change and is supported by the literature on the protection of 
World Heritage sites in particular. For example, Australian climate experts Don Rothwell 
and Tim Stephens argue that: 
 
It is predicted that without substantial reductions (“deep cuts”) in global 
emissions of anthropogenic greenhouse gases, the corals of the Great Barrier 
Reef will be decimated and coral cover worldwide will decrease to less than 
5 per cent of most reefs by 2050.
81
 
 
As evidenced by the Petitions to the World Heritage Committee and recent World 
Heritage Reports, the science points to similar fates for a wide range of World Heritage 
protected sites and ecosystems unless urgent action is taken to mitigate climate impacts.  
 
The Kyoto Protocol is the agreed international mechanism for systematic reductions of 
GHG emissions, but will meeting targets under this Protocol suffice to satisfy States 
Parties‟ duties under Article 4? Climate experts suggest that the Kyoto Protocol, even if it 
were ratified and faithfully implemented by all of the world‟s industrialised countries, 
would reduce projected warming by one-twentieth of one degree Celsius by 2050.
82
 As 
previously mentioned, in order to stabilise global temperatures at less than an average 
increase of 2-3C to prevent „dangerous‟ climate change, GHG emissions will need to be 
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reduced by 60-80 per cent on 1990 levels by 2050.
83
 Taking into account the 
overwhelming historic and ongoing responsibility of industrialised countries for GHG 
emissions and the development requirements of developing countries,
84
 industrialised 
countries may need to reduce their emissions further still. Thus, a strict interpretation of 
the obligation under Article 4 or the Convention may require States Parties to go beyond 
their commitments under the Kyoto Protocol and commit to more aggressive national 
emissions reductions targets. The recent Climate Change Bill 2007 (UK) which mandates 
GHG emissions reductions of 30 per cent of 1990 levels by 2020, and 60 per cent by 
2050
85
 provides one example of how this could be achieved. Significantly, an obligation 
on States Parties to implement mitigation strategies independent of the Kyoto Protocol 
will also apply to the United States.  
 
Article 5 builds upon and substantiates the obligation of States to take all necessary 
actions to protect World Heritage in Article 4. Alongside national emissions reduction 
targets, detailed guidance on other “appropriate legal, scientific, technical, administrative 
and financial measures” to reduce GHG emissions and thereby ensure the “identification, 
protection, conservation, presentation and rehabilitation of heritage” is provided in highly 
respected sources such as the Stern Review and the IPCC‟s Working Group III Report on 
“Mitigation of Climate Change”. For example, the most recent IPCC Working Group III 
Report details an array of measures, technologies and practices by which GHG emissions 
can be mitigated or even reduced to below current levels. A diverse range of national 
policies and instruments are available to governments including: integrating climate 
policies in broader development strategies; emissions regulations and standards; carbon 
taxes and levies; emissions trading schemes; subsidies and tax credits to stimulate 
technological development and diffusion; voluntary agreements between industry and 
governments; educational campaigns; and RD&D.
86
 If national emissions targets as 
arguably required under Article 4 are adopted, they will guide the development of other 
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 McGrath, above n 3, 4. 
84
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 AAP Reuters, “British Climate Bill Nearing Completion” (2007) Sydney Morning Herald 16 August 
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legislative and policy measures which may include binding targets for the uptake of 
renewable energy, energy efficiency regulation, plans for the development of world-class 
public transport systems, and stringent regulation of land clearing and logging of 
rainforests.
87
 Although States have discretion in deciding which measures are 
“appropriate” for the protection and conservation of their World Heritage sites, this 
discretion must be exercised in good faith.
88
 This entails the adoption of a comprehensive 
range of “effective and active measures” as part of intensive national mitigation 
strategies.  
 
States Parties‟ obligations to take strong measures to protect World Heritage in their own 
territories are reinforced by the non-discretionary obligation in Article 6(3) not to 
deliberately harm to other States‟ World Heritage properties. Given the broad scientific 
consensus regarding the impacts of GHG emissions on the global climate, States can no 
longer claim that such impacts are unintentional or unforeseeable. In this context, one 
State‟s GHG-emitting activities may be characterised as deliberate acts resulting in 
deterioration of other States‟ World Heritage properties in breach of Article 6(3). This 
means that the Convention may be interpreted as imposing an obligation on all States 
Parties to reduce their GHG emissions, regardless of whether or not World Heritage 
properties in their own territories are being adversely affected by climate change.
89
 Thus, 
States Parties have an obligation in relation to their own and other States‟ World Heritage 
sites to drastically reduce their GHG emissions.  
 
On a practical level, however, there are significant obstacles that may prevent the World 
Heritage Committee from adopting a strong stance on States Parties‟ mitigation of GHG 
emissions in the foreseeable future. Some State Parties are likely to view strong action 
from the Committee on climate change as undermining the spirit and substance of what 
they agreed to in ratifying the Convention in the first instance. This position was argued 
in the US Administration‟s position paper in response to the five earlier in danger 
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petitions considered at a World Heritage Committee meeting in March 2006. The paper 
stated that: 
 
There is no compelling argument for the Committee to address the issue of 
global climate change – especially at the risk of losing the unified spirit and 
camaraderie that has come to be synonymous with World Heritage.
90
 
 
Whilst it is acknowledged that the negotiators of the Convention did not envisage threats 
on the magnitude and scale of climate change, the Convention was designed to protect 
against all threats to the world‟s natural and cultural heritage both at the time and in the 
future.
91
 The broad protections contained in the Convention clearly encompass climate 
change. Moreover, the US Administration‟s position paper was premised in part on the 
argument that there is doubt on the science of climate change, asserting that “there is no 
unanimity regarding the impacts, causes, and how to or if man can affect the changes we 
are observing”.92 However, as outlined above, 2006-2007 marked a watershed period in 
the development of a widespread public and political consensus regarding the causes and 
consequences of anthropogenic climate change, rendering this argument in the US 
position paper obsolete. If the Convention is to have continued relevance and efficacy in 
the coming decades, the serious threats posed by climate change to World Heritage sites 
must be addressed. The most direct and effective way of doing this is by engaging the 
States Parties in far-reaching mitigation strategies.  
 
VI Conclusion 
The World Heritage Convention represents an unlikely ally in the effort to combat global 
climate change. Due to its global network of iconic sites, the Convention is uniquely 
positioned as a catalyst to promote more effective international responses to climate 
change. However, the World Heritage Committee‟s actions to date do not go far enough 
towards realising this potential. The Strategy, which represents the centrepiece of the 
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Committee‟s response to climate change, provides useful guidance on effective 
management and adaptation responses yet is of questionable efficacy due to its weak 
stance on mitigation. A strict reading of the substantive provisions of the Convention 
suggests that States Parties have obligations to take further steps than recommended by 
the Strategy to protect World Heritage sites in their own and other countries from climate 
change. Specifically, it is argued that such obligations include a duty on States Parties to 
commit to „deep cuts‟ in GHG emissions. If the Convention is to remain an effective tool 
for protecting and conserving sites of universal value for future generations States Parties 
must engage in extensive mitigation strategies without delay.  
 
The arguments presented in this paper provide a number of avenues for further research 
and discussion. As outlined above, it is likely that States Parties who are also members of 
the Kyoto Protocol may need to go beyond their targets under the latter agreement, but 
further analysis is needed to determine the precise level of emissions reductions targets 
that individual States Parties must adopt, taking into account the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities. There are also issues of compliance and enforcement that 
warrant further attention. Creative legal thinking regarding how to encourage States 
Parties to exercise their sovereignty to comply with this interpretation of the Convention 
is necessary for this multilateral environmental agreement to be of optimum efficacy in 
addressing global climate change and thereby protecting World Heritage.  
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